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We analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-seven equity markets
around the world, to consider whether short-sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market, and
the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. Using the
approach developed in Morck et.al. (2000) we find significantly more cross-sectional variation in
equity returns in markets where short selling is feasible and practiced, controlling for a host of other
factors. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security
level. A common conjecture by regulators is that short-selling restrictions can reduce the relative
severity of a market panic. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. We
find that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, returns display
significantly less negative skewness, and the frequency of extreme negative returns is lower. On the
other hand, the overall volatility of individual returns and market returns is higher.
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In February of 1609, a group of well-connected Dutch businessmen, led by one of the 
original subscribers to the Dutch East India Company, Isaac Le Maire, formed a secret 
association, a “Groote Companie, ” to short the shares in the East India Company in anticipation 
of the incorporation of a rival French-chartered trading firm. Le Maire and his colleagues sold 
shares forward in a “blanco” transaction promising future delivery in one or two years. Over the 
next twelve months, their profits mounted, as East India Company shares dropped by 12%, 
angering shareholders who inevitably learned of their plan. In January of 1610, a year after the 
formation of the “Groote Companie” and only three years after the official founding of the 
Amsterdam Exchange, the first regulation against short selling was enacted. Share prices 
rebounded, a rival French company was not formed and Isaac Le Maire never succeeded in 
disentangling himself from the litigation that ensued.
1  
At various times over the next four hundred years, short–sellers have been blamed for stock 
market declines, and market participants have called for regulation against short sales.
2 
However, despite centuries of disagreement between speculators and regulators on the topic, no 
one really knows whether short–sales constraints are a good or a bad thing. As the above 
example indicates, short–sales restrictions are nearly as old as organized exchanges, and yet 
there is little empirical evidence on whether they prevent or facilitate market crashes, or whether 
they hinder or help rational price discovery.  
  In this paper, we use cross-sectional and time series information from forty-seven equity 
markets from around the world to examine the question of whether short–sales restrictions affect 
                                                 
1 This account is taken from Montias, John Michael, 1989, Vermeer and His Milieu, Princeton Press, Princeton, p. 
20. The original study of the Le Maire affair may be found in J. G. van Dillen, 1930, “Isaac Le Maire en de handle 
in action der Oost-Indische Companie,” Economisch-historisch Jaarboek 16:46, 107-111. For a discussion on the 
legal and ethical view of short-selling in late Sixteenth Century Holland, see De Marchi and Harrison (1994). 2 
the efficiency of the market and the distributional characteristics of individual as well as market 
returns. We obtain information regarding the history and current practice of short–sales 
restrictions from market regulators, investment banks, and institutional investors specialized in 
short sales. This dataset allows us to characterize each country in terms of the legality, as well as 
the practice, of short selling for the period 1990–2001. Using the approach developed in Mørck, 
Yeung and Yu (2000) [MYY] we find significantly more cross-sectional variation in equity 
returns in markets where short selling is feasible and practiced, controlling for a host of other 
factors.  This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security 
level. 
A common conjecture by regulators is that short–sales restrictions can reduce the 
severity of price declines. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. 
We find some evidence in favor of the conjecture. That is, we find that the lifting of short–sales 
restrictions is associated with increased negative skewness in individual stock returns. Our result 
is thus consistent with the regulatory views of Samuel Untermyer, legal counsel to the 1913 
Pujo Committee of Congress investigating money trusts. In his devastating questioning of Frank 
Stugis, president of the New York Stock Exchange from 1894 to 1898, Untermyer succinctly 
articulated the public fear of short selling during a financial crisis.  
Untermyer: Under what circumstances would you regard… short selling as legitimate 
and proper? 
 
Stugis: I should regard it so if there was a panic raging over the country and it was 
desirable to protect interests which could not be sold. I think it would be a perfectly 
legitimate thing to do. 
 
Untermyer: Let us see about that. If there was a panic raging over the country and a man 
sold stocks short, would not that simply add to the panic? 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 For an excellent review of the history of short-sales restrictions, see “A Short History of the Bear,” by Edward 
Chancellor, October 29, 2001, copyright David W. Tice and Co. 
http://www.prudentbear.com/press_room_short_selling_history.html 3 
Stugis: It might. Self preservation is the first law of nature.
3 
 
This view is echoed by one of the regulators whom we contacted to obtain data for our 
sample. In his words: “forbidding short selling prevents big market swings since the market size 
is limited.” Our analysis sheds light on the costs and benefits of short–sales regulation at the 
individual security level and at the market level.  On the one hand, our data strongly support the 
view that short selling facilitates efficient price discovery—at least to the extent that efficiency 
is captured empirically by the lack of synchronous movement in daily returns.  On the other 
hand, short selling may also facilitate severe price declines in individual securities, at least as 
defined in terms of negative skewness.  Despite the relationship between short sales constraints 
and skewness at the individual security level, we find little compelling evidence that short–sales 
constraints prevent or mitigate severe price declines at the market level.  In particular, we do not 
find that short–sales constraints prevent market crashes. Figure 1 summarizes our findings 
regarding the skewness of the market and the synchronicity of stock returns. We plot both 
variables depending on whether countries allow and commonly practice short sales or not. In 
this figure we do not control for a number of factors that potentially influence co-movement and 
skewness, however the raw data is somewhat instructive. Countries in which short–sales are 
practiced display less co-movement and  modestly  more negative skewness. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  Note that some countries — Hong Kong, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, and Thailand — 
appear twice on the figure.  This is because they lifted short–sales constraints in the period of 
our study.  For example, short–sales restrictions for Sweden were eliminated in 1991. Before 
that date, 93 percent of the stocks moved together, and the market skewness was –0.50. In the 
                                                 
3 Untermyer, Samuel, 1915, “Speculation on the Stock Exchanges and Public Regulation of the Exchanges,” 4 
period since 1991, the comovement of stocks declined to 76 percent, and the market skewness 
increased to -0.04. Sweden’s positional shift in the figure is the common pattern among the 
countries that relaxed short–sales constraints.
4 The international evidence shown in Figure 1 at 
least suggests that short–sales might play an important role in efficiency and market crash 
probability. In the remainder of this paper, we investigate these potential relationships in 
econometric detail.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the current literature on 
short–sales and discuss our contributions in the context of related research. In Section 3 we 
summarize the range of short–sales regulations and practices in markets around the world. 
Section 4 reports the results of the MYY test of relative pricing efficiency. Section 5 reports the 
statistical characteristics of market and security returns associated with short–sales and tests for 
differences in skewness conditional upon restrictions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature  Review 
Short–sales play an important role in asset pricing models and the theory of portfolio choice. 
Most neo-classical models in finance (c.f. Ross, 1976) rely upon the ability of market 
participants to take off-setting positions in close economic substitutes in order to enforce a law 
of one price. Considerable research in the last decade has explored the effects of short–sales and 
frictions in an asset market. For example, Luttmer (1993), Chen (1995, 2001), He and Modest 
(1997), Hansen and Jagannathan (1997), Jouini and Kallal (2001), Duffie, Garleanu and 
Pedersen (2002) all address the effect of market frictions and seek to characterize the magnitude 
of mispricing that may obtain. Diamond and Verecchia (1987) explore the effects of short–sales 
                                                                                                                                                            
American Economic Review, 5(1) Supplement, Papers and Proceedings, pages 24-68. 
4 Section VI.A in the paper shows that the difference in skewness before and after the change in regulation is not 
significantly different from zero. 5 
constraints on the speed of price-adjustment to private information. Recently, Hong and Stein 
(2002) develop a heterogeneous agent model linking short–sales constraints to market crashes. 
In their model, if some investors are constrained from selling short, their accumulated 
unrevealed negative information will not be manifest until the market begins to drop, which 
further aggravates market declines and leads to a crash. They motivate the model with the 
observation that the U.S. market displays negative skewness.  
Most of the research cited above suggests that short–sales constraints have an adverse 
effect on efficiency—the only question is how much. On the other hand, an interesting 
exception is the argument of Allen and Gale (1991) who point out that the potential for financial 
innovation renders short selling a destabilizing influence in the economy.  This is potentially 
interesting in light of our findings that short sales tend to be allowed in major markets where 
financial innovations occur—particularly with respect to capital structure and new security 
development -- and that these markets also tend to display relatively higher negative skewness 
in returns. Bernardo and Welch (2002) develop a model describing how the fear of financial 
crisis, instead of  a real liquidity shock, is the true cause of financial crises. One implication of 
their model is that putting constraints that hinder some market participants from front-running 
other investors can effectively prevent financial crisis from happening, supporting the finding of 
Allen and Gale (1991) that short sales can potentially destabilize the economy.   
Empirical evidence on short selling largely supports the theoretical view that constraining it 
hinders price discovery.  In a recent paper, Jones and Lamont (2002) use early 20
th Century U.S 
data to show that stocks which are expensive to short have high valuations and low subsequent 
returns. Their finding is consistent with the hypothesis that difficult-to-short stocks are over-
priced. Using data on DotComs, Ofek and Richardson (2002) show that short–sales constraints, 
in the form of stock option lock–ups, have considerable and persistent negative impact on 6 
subsequent stock returns, also supporting the argument that stock prices do not fully incorporate 
information under short–sales constraints. Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002) use a comprehensive 
dataset of short sales, and find that short–selling restrictions have a mixed impact on the 
profitability of well–known arbitrage strategies.  
Short selling requires the ability to borrow securities. As we will discuss in this study, 
securities borrowing and lending can directly determine the costs of short selling and hence 
should be considered in conjunction with short–sales constraints. In our empirical analysis, we 
classify countries into categories according to whether short selling is practiced. Although short 
selling is allowed in some countries, securities borrowing and lending is so limited that short 
sales are not really feasible. D’Avolio (2002) provides empirical evidence about securities 
borrowing and lending in U.S. stock markets that demonstrates considerable cross-sectional 
variation in the feasibility of maintaining short positions, depending on the divergence of market 
opinion.  
Short selling is an important tool used by speculators to exploit over-priced securities. 
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) explore the importance of speculators in emerging market 
efficiency. They find that the cost of capital, an indicator of market efficiency, decreases after a 
capital market liberalization. They stress the importance of a regulatory change to a country’s 
openness to speculators—this would naturally extend to short–sales restrictions and thus our 
work fits naturally into the literature on the globalization of capital markets.  Harvey and co-
authors have also contributed to our knowledge about skewness in returns, although their 
findings are not explicitly connected to capital market regulatory changes per se. In a series of 
studies, Harvey and Sidique (1999, 2000a, 200b) point out that return  skewness appears to be 
priced in both the U.S. and  the world capital market. If regulators’ believe that short selling 
regulation can indeed prevent market crises, then Harvey and Sidique’ research suggests that 7 
there should be implications for expected returns and volatility in  financial markets around the 
world.   
There are a few key empirical studies that seek to understand the impact of short–sales 
regulations on return distributions using international data. Aitken et al. (1998) offer evidence 
from the Australian Stock Exchange suggesting that short sales trades reflect significant bad 
news about companies. Poitras (2002) concludes that rights issues trade below the arbitrage 
boundary because of short sale restrictions on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES). Biais et 
al. (1999) use data from the Paris Bourse and show that a market with short–sales constraints 
reflects good news significantly faster than bad news. Li and Fleisher (2002), using Chinese 
stock market data, find that the dispersion of domestic analysts’ forecasts is negatively 
correlated to stock returns in the A-share market, where short–sales restrictions are binding, and 
not significantly related to the return of B-shares where short–sales restrictions are not binding. 
Studying the impact of short–sales constraints in an international setting avoids potential 
country specific factors and generalizes the findings on short–sales regulations.  
In sum, most theory and empirical evidence from the U.S. and non-U.S. markets suggest that 
short–sales constraints are an impediment to price discovery—particularly when the news is 
bad. Some theories argue that limiting short–sales may be necessary under certain conditions to 
achieve equilibrium, however thus far there is no empirical test of the contrary proposition.  
 
III.  Short–Sales Restrictions Around the World 
Our main data source for short–sales regulation and practice is information provided by 
investment banks. The Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Global Network Management Division 
(GNM) has compiled information regarding short–sales regulation, impediments and practices 
from their global network of sub-custodian banks for 59 countries, and they made a summary of 8 
this research available to us. We obtained similar information from the International Securities 
Lending Division at Goldman Sachs (ISL). The ISL complements the information from GNM in 
two important aspects. It provides detailed information on the tax effects of short positions, the 
settlement cycle of short sales, and the registration requirements for shorting in 46 countries. 
There are some countries for which the GNM and ISL data indicates that short selling is not 
practiced despite the fact that a widely used guide, the Worldwide Directory of Securities 
Lending and Repo (WDSLP), lists institutional investors involved in short sales in those 
countries. In these cases, we contacted the listed institutions to understand the discrepancy. In 
most cases we found they were not active in short sales, or else they were mostly focused on 
securities lending. An exception is Singapore where it appears that, even though short selling is 
not formally allowed, it is widely practiced, although short sales are typically executed off-
exchange between depository agents. We obtained additional information on securities trading, 
settlement and tax laws from the International Securities Services Association (ISSA) 
Handbook, however ISSA only provides current information on these issues. 
In addition to information provided by investment banks, industry publications and 
market participants, we contacted the equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commissions 
of the 59 countries in the GNM dataset to learn what we could from them about regulation and 
practice. Information from market regulators was particularly useful in allowing us to track the 
history of short–sales regulations for each country over the last fifteen years.  With their help we 
are  able to examine some key regulatory regime shifts in our empirical analysis. We found in 
general that the information provided by practitioners was more detailed than the information 
from regulators, although it should not be surprising that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
Dean Witter know more about market practice than regulators themselves. For instance, in one 
case, regulators told us that short–selling was not practiced in their market, while ISL indicated 9 
that most of the short–selling transactions for that market take place offshore—outside the 
purview of the regulatory agency. What regulators may lack in specific knowledge about market 
practice they typically make up for in interest in the current project. Many of the regulatory 
agencies we contacted expressed a strong desire to learn the results of our study, because the 
question of the efficacy of short–sales restrictions continue to be an issue of interest. 
Our information  about short–sales regulations and practice is summarized in Table 1. 
Out of the 59 countries in the GNM dataset, we exclude the countries for which we could not 
find individual firm stock price data. This leaves a sample of 47 countries. In 35 of them, short 
selling is currently allowed, at least as of December 2001, the final date of our sample period. In 
12 of these 47, short–sales were prohibited for the entire sample period of January, 1990 to 
December, 2001. In 12 of the 35 countries where short–sales are currently  allowed,  restrictions 
existed in 1990 but were lifted at some point within the sample period. These countries are: 
Chile, Hong Kong, Hungary, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, Thailand, and Turkey. In three cases—Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Thailand—
restrictions on short selling were removed and later re-enacted gradually.
5  
                                                 
5 In Malaysia, the Securities Commission issued in December 1995 the Guidelines on Securities Borrowing and 
Lending, and the Securities Industry Act of 1993 was amended to allow short sales. The regulatory changes came 
into force on March 7, 1996, and allowed the local exchange—the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange—to enact short–
selling rules. With that, regulated short selling commenced on September 30, 1996. However, in August 28, 1997, 
and in the onset of the Asian financial crises, these activities were suspended as interim measures to prevent 
excessive volatility in the markets.  In February, 2001 the Securities Commission launched a plan—the Capital 
Market Masterplan—that recommended the re-introduction of short selling and securities lending activities.  
In Hong Kong, short selling was prohibited before January 3, 1994. The SEHK then allowed 17 out of the 33 
constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Index (HSI) to be sold short subject to several restrictions. These restrictions 
were lifted on March 25, 1996 at the same time that 113 of the firms listed on the exchange, including all the 
constituent stocks of the index, were allowed to be sold short. 
 In Thailand, the Securities Exchange Commission first enforced short–sales regulations on July, 1997, suspending 
them because of the currency crises.  Beginning on January 1, 1998, short sales were allowed again in the Thai 
capital market, through financial institutions licensed to operate securities borrowing and lending (SBL) business. 
The practice of short selling has increased gradually: in 1999 there were only three securities companies licensed to 
operate SBL. Although ISL and GND characterize Thailand as a country where short sales are a common practice, 
market regulators were aware of only one transaction since 1997, apart from “mistaken” transactions done by 
brokers. 10 
There is clearly a difference between what the law allows and what is common practice. 
Although short selling is currently legal in most countries, it is only practiced in 28. In some 
countries, tax rules make shorting very difficult. In Chile for instance, although short selling and 
securities lending have been possible since 1999, they are rarely used because lending is 
considered an immediate, taxable sale. Given that there is no sale price, the relevant price is the 
highest price of the stock on the day it is lent; if it is higher than the purchase price, capital gains 
tax will apply. In Turkey, stock lending is treated as a normal transaction by the tax authorities, 
and as such it is liable to capital gains tax where applicable. In Finland, transfer laws also place 
a serious burden on this activity. In countries like the Philippines or Turkey, short selling is 
allowed, but the rules are not yet clearly defined. In Thailand, evidence of the practice is murky. 
Regulators in that country believe that short selling is not practiced because the market for 
borrowing stock is very narrow, especially on the supply side, due to the absence of a futures 
market. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
There are some other features of short–selling practices throughout the world that are 
relevant for our purposes. In some markets only the largest and most liquid stocks may be 
shorted. Until 1996, Hong Kong only allowed short sales in securities specifically designated by 
the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd.  A similar rule currently operates in Greece. More 
objective criteria are found in Poland, where any security with a market capitalization of at least 
250 million zloty qualifies. We adopt the convention of classifying Hong Kong as a country 
where short selling is allowed only after 1996, even though it was allowed for a subset of stocks 
beginning in 1994.
6  For Poland and Greece, GNM reports that short selling is not practiced.  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
6 See footnote 5. 11 
We also regard short selling as allowed and practiced in a country even if some investors 
are prohibited from entering into these transactions. In Sweden, for example, traders can go 
short without having borrowed the shares in advance,
7 while individual investors must borrow 
the shares before they go short. In Greece prior to 2001, short selling was only available to the 
members of the Athens Derivatives Exchange.  Some countries only impose short–sales 
restrictions on foreign investors. In Brazil, for instance, a short seller must have a domestic legal 
representative.  In India, foreign investors are prohibited from short selling.  It is fair to say that 
for every country in our sample, there exist some constellation of laws, regulations, institutional 
norms, variation in practice and fine print governing the ability to take and maintain a short 
position in a stock. Our challenge in this paper has been to categorize them in economically 
meaningful ways. 
Although the actual practice of short selling depends upon laws, regulation, frictions and 
costs in markets, we are forced to reduce the complexities to a single dimension for purposes of 
analysis. We classify countries in our sample into four groups, depending on whether short 
selling is legal and practiced.  This classification of course misses the nuances of expenses and 
risks that potentially characterize differences in short selling across international markets. 
Never-the-less, even this basic simplification yields interesting results. In the first group we 
have the countries where short selling became legal some time before 1990, and where short 
selling is currently practiced. This group includes the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
8 Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and Switzerland. The second 
group consists of countries in which short sales were prohibited as of December, 2001.  These 
                                                 
7 They must borrow the stock before the end of the day, however. 12 
are: Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, the Slovak Republic, 
South Korea, Taiwan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The third group is comprised of countries in 
which short selling is allowed but rarely practiced: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Finland, India, 
Israel, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland, Spain,
9 and Turkey. Finally, the remaining five 
countries—Hong Kong, Norway, Sweden, Malaysia, and Thailand—comprise a group for 
which short–sales regulation and practice changed sometime between January, 1990 and 
December, 2001. 
 
IV.  Equity Market Data and Sources 
The international return, volume and issue data for the 47 markets in our study come from 
Datastream, and our U.S. data come from CRSP.  Prices and returns are measured in local 
currency. We construct value-weighted market indices for each country in the sample. It is 
important to note that the number of firms per country varies across years, and thus the volatility 
of the market index might vary with time as a consequence, since there are typically fewer 
constituent firms in the indices for some countries in the earlier years of the sample.
10 For this 
reason we estimate a year-fixed effects model in most of our statistical analysis. 
We obtain accounting data from Worldscope for non-U.S. firms, and Compustat for U.S. 
firms. We also obtain country information from the Economist Intelligence Unit database and 
from the World Bank. In particular, we characterize each country in our sample by its 
geographical size, the GDP per capita, and the variance of GDP growth. Finally, we construct an 
                                                                                                                                                            
8The Prague Stock Exchange was established on November 1992, and the automated trading system started 
operations in January 1993. We include the Czech Republic in the group of countries where short selling is allowed 
and practiced, although we only have data on Czech firms since 1993. 
9 Chile made short selling legal only in 2000, but there is no current practice. Spain legalized short selling in 1992, 
but only securities lending facilities are common among institutions, as a way of facilitating hedging strategies.  
10 Datastream has an acceptable coverage only after 1995.  13 
index of good government following MYY, as the sum of indices of corruption, risk of 
government repudiation of contracts, and risk of expropriation of private property in La Porta et 
al. (1997). 
V.  Short–Sales Restrictions and the Co-movement of Stock Returns 
The first question in our analysis is whether short–sales restrictions play a role in efficient 
price discovery.  The key implication of Diamond and Verecchia (1987) for example, is that 
short–sales constraints impede the market’s ability to rapidly impound value-relevant 
information.  As the voluminous literature on the efficient market theory suggests, there is no 
universal test for relative market efficiency, although event studies and filter rules have a long 
history of application. An important recent contribution to the literature on market efficiency is 
MYY’s observation that more efficient markets can be expected to have more idiosyncratic risk, 
since the ratio of firm-specific information to market-level information is likely to be higher in 
informational environments that allow market participants to acquire information and act 
quickly and inexpensively upon it. MYY examine international differences in the degree of co-
movement in stock prices across countries around the world, and find that the ratio of 
idiosyncratic risk in relatively developed markets is higher than in markets that are commonly 
viewed as less developed—particularly emerging markets. In our analysis, we use the MYY 
measure as a proxy for market efficiency, and then test whether cross-sectional differences in 
short–sales constraints correlate well to it.  
 
a.  Measures of Price Synchronicity 
Following MYY, for each country in our sample and for every year, we calculate two aggregate 
measures of individual security co-movement. 14 
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down is the number of stocks whose price fall. We then average the f’s 
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where δ iT is the number of trading weeks in country i and year T. The ratio of stocks moving 
together varies between 0.5 and 1, numbers closer to 1 indicate more co-movement. MYY argue 
that more co-movement implies less efficient price discovery in the market, since stock specific 
information is presumably the driver of any deviation in co-movement among stocks. Thus, 
cross-sectional idiosyncratic risk is another potential way to capture this intuition. We thus also 
compute the R
2 for regressions of the form: 
ijt mjt i ij ijt r r ε β α + + =       (3) 
That is, we regress weekly stock returns on the value-weighted market return, for every firm i 
and in every year (where week t belongs to year T). We then average the R
2s for each country j 













2        ( 4 )  
where SST is the sum of squares in regression (3).  15 
MYY find that developing economies display significantly higher levels of co-
movement than more developed ones. In particular, they find that co-movement is explained in 
the cross-section by the GDP per capita. They provide several hypotheses why this can happen, 
and show that, when interacted with an index of good government, the significance of the GDP 
per capital disappears. 
One potentially important explanation for such a pattern is that smaller countries have 
less-diversified stock markets.  To address this issue, MYY use country-level and industry-level 
Herfindahl indices.  The former captures the cross-industry concentration based upon sales, the 
latter captures the average within-industry concentration based upon sales.   To see how this 
might work, consider some extreme examples: Finland and Norway vs. the U.S.  In Finland, 
Nokia represents more than 50% of the market capitalization of the Helsinki Stock Exchange. In 
terms of domestic sales, the telecommunications giant accounts for 5% of the total sales in the 
country, and 19.6% of the sales in its industry. Indeed, Telecom Equipment accounted for 
22.82% of the total sales of Finnish companies. 
The country-Herfindahl index for Finland is 12.28. This is not dramatically higher than 
the a median of 11.02 for all the countries in the sample. The industry-Herfindahl index for 
Finland is 8.29 (compared to a median 7.11 for the whole sample). This means that, even though 
the telecom industry is highly concentrated, the other industries are not.  In contrast, Norway, 
has a country-Herfindahl measure of 73, and an industry-Herfindahl measure of 17.82. In this 
case it is driven by the natural resources industries that represent the bulk of the industrial 
production in Norway.   For the U.S., the country-Herfindahl measure is 4.45 in 2001, and the 
industry-Herfindahl measure is 2.25%. Thus, Norway has a low cross-sectional dispersion in 
firm returns due to its industrial structure, not necessarily because of  relative market efficiency, 
and the Herfindahl indices appear to be a useful control. 16 
In our analysis, we replicate as closely as possible the estimation and control variables 
used in MYY, adding a short–sales indicator variable. We construct indices of industry 
concentration (by industry and country, as described in their paper), indices of earnings 
comovement,
11 and calculate the number of listed firms in each country and year. The short–
sales indicator is a dummy variable that equals one whenever short selling is allowed and 
practiced in a given country and year, and zero otherwise.  If a country changed its regulation in 
a given year, we eliminate that observation from the sample.  Our final panel with complete data 
includes 503 observations. The earnings co-movement index is available for only a subset of 
countries. When we use it the number of observations is reduced to 268. We estimate the model 
with year–fixed effects and country–fixed effects. We control for several country–and–year 
specific factors, such as the GDP per capita, the country and industry Herfindahl indices and the 
earnings co-movement index. Whenever country–fixed effects are not used, we additionally 
control for time–invariant variables, like the geographical size of the country, the variance in 
GDP growth, and the good government index. As in MYY, the dependent variable is 
transformed into a continuous variable over the range [-∞ ,+∞ ]. We report the results of the 
estimation in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
b.   Results 
The first panel in Table 2 replicates the MYY results, although our sample is 
significantly different in time and cross-section from theirs. Despite these sample differences, 
we generally confirm the MYY finding that countries with higher GDP per capita display lower 
                                                 
11 Since we replicate the procedure in MYY, we do not provide details on how these variables are computed. 17 
stock price synchronicity.  The only exception is that in our first specification with both 
country– and year–fixed effects, the coefficient on log-GDP per capita is positive and 
significant. In this case, the GDP per capita must be interpreted strictly in a time–series sense: 
stock price co-movement increases in a country as its GDP per capita grows. The economic 
interpretation of this positive relationship is not clear, however the sign on GDP becomes 
negative as we eliminate either country– or year–fixed effects in other specifications. The good 
government index is also statistically significant, with two caveats: (i) the coefficient displays 
different signs depending on the specification, and (ii) the GDP per capita does not become 
insignificant once the good government index is introduced in the regression. We suspect these 
differences are due to the larger cross-section of countries we use in our analysis, but they could 
also be due to the fact that there have been secular changes in the residual risk component in 
different countries. In recent years, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) for example, note 
a dramatic downward shift in residual risk for the U.S. If other countries experienced similar 
trends in residual risk, then the cross-sectional correlation to other variables could certainly 
change. 
The second panel in Table 2 shows that lifting short–sales restrictions is associated with 
an increase in the idiosyncratic portion of stock returns. The coefficient on the short–sales 
indicator is negative and significant at the 1 percent level or more in each specification. This 
result is evidently not driven by country differences. That is, the description of legal regimes in 
Section III shows that, in general, more developed markets allow short selling while developing 
markets restrict it. However, the short–selling indicator remains significant when we allow for 
both year– and country–fixed effects.  This is possible because we have inter-temporal changes 
in short–sales practices for some countries in our sample.  Moreover, the short–sales indicator is 18 
significant after controlling for differences in the GDP per capita across countries, and the 
number of listed firms. 
We perform a similar analysis with the R
2s of the regressions of stock returns on market 
indices. These results are reported in Table 3.  Following MYY, we have transformed the R
2s to 
map them to the set of real numbers. The short–sales indicator is significant and has a negative 
coefficient in all specifications, except when country– and year–fixed effects are estimated.  The 
differences between Table 2 and Table 3 may be due to the non-parametric nature of the 
synchronicity measure. Although it does not capture magnitude differences in residual risk, it is 
presumably robust to extreme outliers. Using R
2s, the GDP per capita becomes insignificant 
once we include the short–sales indicator. However, the good government index is either unable 
to eliminate the significance of the GDP per capita, or displays a positive coefficient, which 
contradicts the findings of MYY. Only when the earnings co-movement index enters the last 
regression in the bottom panel in Table 3 do both the government index and the GDP per capita 
become insignificant.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In economic terms, a coefficient of –0.431 for the indicator means that for the average country, 
the removal of short–selling restrictions reduces the R
2 of the average stock by 27%. In other 
words, the idiosyncratic risk of the average stock increases by 27%. As we show, this result is 
robust to country differences, different time periods, and institutional differences. An economic 
rationale for our findings is provided by Campbell et al. (2001), who observe that the proportion 
of idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. has increased significantly in recent years. Despite the analyst 
scandals characterizing the post-Enron U.S. market, they suggest the trend towards more 
residual risk may result from the increasing availability of value-relevant firm-specific 
information  which may in turn be impounded into stock prices in a liquid market.  19 
 
VI.  Short–Sales Restrictions and the Distribution of Stock Returns 
In this section we examine the distribution of stock returns conditional upon short–sales 
restrictions.  We compute statistics for three different series’ for each country. First we construct 
weekly stock returns for each firm in our sample with at least 100 daily observations available 
in a given year. We also construct time series’ of weekly returns for the corresponding market 
indices. Finally, we run, for every year and each firm, regressions specified in equation (3), and 
save the residuals from the regression as abnormal firm returns.  In a market with many 
systematic shocks, firms’ raw returns may primarily reflect systematic shocks and thus the 
residual may be of interest. Because equity returns are distributed approximately log-normal, we 
transform the three groups of returns into their logarithmic representation, and compute the 
skewness, standard deviation, and frequency of extreme returns. 
We find weak evidence that supports regulators’ view that short–selling constraints help 
prevent financial panics, at least for individual securities. The distribution of individual stock 
returns in our sample are less negatively skewed when short–selling is prohibited. There is also 
a significantly lower chance of a negative extreme return when short–selling is prohibited. Both 
findings offer some support that short–selling regulations prevent extreme negative returns. 
However, we find little evidence that short–sales constraints reduce the negative skewness of 
market level returns. 
 
   A. Skewness 
Hong and Stein (2002) develop a model in which investors possess different information 
about the value of a stock. Investors with negative information cannot always use it due to 20 
short–sale constraints.  They would be willing to sell the stock to high–valuation investors, but 
they do not necessarily own it. The Hong and Stein model provides a rationale for why stock 
returns display negative skewness. Their paper predicts that elevated trading volume should be 
associated with increased negative skewness. Indeed, in the accompanying empirical study, 
Chen et al. (2002) test the proposition that abnormal turnover is a predictor of negative 
skewness. They find consistent evidence on a sample of NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period 
July, 1962 to December, 1998: at the firm level, changes in turnover predict future negative 
skewness.  
A reasonable implication of the Hong and Stein model is that whenever short–selling 
restrictions are removed, skewness should be become less negative. Our objective in this section 
is to test this proposition.   Given that skewness is almost certainly affected by country– and 
time–specific effects, we perform a cross-sectional analysis that controls for these factors.  In 
addition to the country-specific controls, we follow Chen et al. (2001), who find that the de-
trended turnover and past market returns are predictors of skewness. We construct the average 
de-trended turnover for the countries in our sample as follows. We first calculate the de-trended 
volume by firm, by subtracting the previous-year volume from the current volume.
12 We then 
calculate the sum of de-trended volumes for all firms in a given country and year, and divide by 
the total number of shares outstanding for all the firms in the country with available data on 
volume.
13  
Results from the estimation are in Table 4. Interestingly,  we find that short–sales 
restrictions are associated with less negative, not more negative skewness. The short–sales 
indicator explains the skewness of raw and market-adjusted individual stock returns.   However 
                                                 
12 Note that we lose one year of observations for every firm. 
13 We try an alternative specification that consists of calculating the market turnover first, and then de-trending it. 
This methodology, similar to Chen et al. (2001), provides qualitatively similar results. 21 
the evidence for the market itself in each country is insignificant once control variables like size 
are added.
14 We also find that, without controlling for short–sales restrictions, less developed 
countries,  i.e. those with lower GDP per capita, have more positively skewed returns. However, 
the significance of the coefficient disappears once we control for short selling.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In sum, for markets in which short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, there is 
no evidence that returns display significantly less negative skewness at the individual stock 
level. However, at the market level, where the welfare effects are greatest and where regulators 
expect short–sales to reduce crashes, it makes little difference whether short sales are allowed 
and practiced, once we control for macroeconomic factors. 
In addition to these results we find some evidence consistent with the theoretical model 
in Hong and Stein (2002) in that differences of opinion, proxied by the lagged de-trended 
turnover, predict more negative skewness. We also find weak evidence that lagged market 
returns help predict negative skewness.  The coefficient on lagged market returns is negative 
and significant only when the dependent variable is the skewness of raw returns. 
 
B. Volatility of Returns 
In Table 5 we study the effect of short–sales restrictions on the volatility of individual 
stock returns. We calculate the average standard deviation of individual stock returns, and use 
its logarithm as endogenous variable in the regressions, hence it can take any real value. As 
usual, we employ country– and time–specific variables  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
14 In  a specification that does not control for year and GDP effects we find a significant association between short-22 
The coefficient for the short–sales indicator is always negative and significant at the 1 
percent level—consistent with the association of short–sales restrictions and higher return 
volatility—except for the case in which we use country– and year–fixed effects. Returns are 
more volatile in less developed countries, but the significance of the result disappears once we 
control for the good government index. In that regard, better–governed countries display lower 
return volatility.  Returns are also less volatile in countries with less volatile fundamentals—
measured by the variance in GDP growth and the earnings co-movement index.  In general, our 
analysis of the cross-sectional differences in the volatility of returns conditional upon short–
selling restrictions should be considered in light of the potential that any association uncovered 
between the two might be driven by reverse causality.  Riskier markets in general are more 
likely to pose concerns for regulators whose goals presumably include investor protection. 
 
C. Crashes 
C.1.  Sample of All Countries 
Arguably the most important rationale for short–sales restrictions is that short selling is 
responsible for recent market crashes in the world financial market—particularly the 1987 
market crash and the 1997 Asian crisis. Our objective in this section is to evaluate the empirical 
evidence for such a view. 
The main difficulty in estimating the probability and severity of a market crash 
conditional upon the existence of short–sales restrictions is the Peso problem: we only have data 
on realized crashes. One alternative is to measure the extent of market drops during crisis events 
depending upon the existence of short–selling restrictions. However, this would not answer the 
                                                                                                                                                            
sales restrictions and  a reduction in negative market skewness.  We do not report these results in a table. 23 
question of whether crashes are more likely in the presence of short–sellers. If we believe 
market regulators, short selling may not trigger a crash, but simply make it more severe. 
We therefore calculate the number of days in our sample period in which stock returns 
are below two standard deviations from their previous year average. We divide this number by 
the total number of trading days, and then compute the frequency of extreme returns. Under the 
assumption that returns are log-normally distributed, the percentage should equal 2.5 percent.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In Table 6 we regress the frequency of extreme results on a set of explanatory variables. 
We do not include the number of listed firms as an explanatory variable because the 
denominator in the frequency calculation is the number of trading days per year times the 
number of listed firms in a given country and year. Therefore, there is an almost exact linear 
relationship between a log transformation of the frequency of extreme events, and the log of the 
number of listed firms.  
In Table 6, short–sales restrictions are only weakly  and insignificantly associated with 
more frequent extreme negative returns. None of the explanatory variables, except for the short–
sales indicator, display a positive coefficient. There is only once specification for which we 
reject the null.  This is the case in which we use a sub-sample of country–years for which we 
have data on earnings co-movement. The evidence from this table suggests that the probability 
of extreme negative returns is not likely to be a function of  short-sales practices in countries, 
but rather determined by other non–specified, country–specific factors. 
 24 
C.2. Countries with Regulatory Changes 
To shed some light on the relationship between short–sales constraints and extreme 
returns, and in order to eliminate a number of the potential cross-sectional differences that might 
explain the results thus far, we restrict our attention to the sub-set of countries that changed 
regulations over the period 1990–2001. Essentially this should allow a good hedonic control, 
country by country, at least under the assumption that the regulatory change is not triggered by 
shifts in other characteristics.  These countries are Hong Kong, Norway, Sweden, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. In the case of Hong Kong, Norway, Sweden, and Thailand, short–selling restrictions 
were removed in a specific year (not the same calendar year for each country). In Malaysia—as 
we detail in section III—short selling was allowed only for the period 1995–1997, and was then 
prohibited again in 1997 at the onset of the Asian financial crises.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Table 8 reports the frequency of extreme events for the five countries, around the year in 
which short sales become effective. We calculate the average by year-to-event,
15 and find that, 
on average, the frequency of extreme returns is 3.69 percent one year after restrictions are lifted. 
In some years, however, extreme returns are too frequent (7.28 percent year t+5, 7.10 percent in 
year t+6). In Norway, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, extreme returns are more frequent in all but 
one of the periods, compared to period t-1, in which short sales are allowed.  In Sweden, the 
frequency of extreme results is higher after 1991 than in 1990, one year before the lifting of 
short–selling restrictions. However, in Thailand the effect of short sales is a reduction of the 
percentage of extreme returns, compared to the pre-1997 period. It therefore seems that the 
effect of short sales on crashes may be somewhat country–specific.   
                                                 
15 Malaysia is not included in years after t+2, because short sales were prohibited again in 1997. 25 
Cross-sectional regression results using yearly information for the aforementioned five 
countries are reported in Table 8.  We employ the same controls in these regressions as in  
previous sections. The power of the results declines substantially as expected, since we have 
only 45 observations. Unlike the previous estimates, we find that the frequency of extreme 
declines is marginally associated with relaxation of short–sales constraints. The coefficient on 
the short–sales indicator is significant at the 10 percent level in two of the specifications when 
we do not use country–fixed effects. It also has a time–series interpretation.  The lifting of 
short–sales restrictions results in an average increase in the frequency of extreme returns. When 
we estimate the regression with country– and year– fixed effects (the first model), we find some 
support for the hypothesis that short sales increase the probability of a crisis.   We certainly find  
no evidence in favor of a positive relationship between short–sales restrictions and severity of 
market crashes. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
D. Kernel Estimation of Return Distributions 
Thus far, we have looked at various statistics of conditional distributions.  It is instructive, 
however, to look at the return densities themselves.  We perform a kernel estimation of a density 
functions of stock returns with and without short–sales constraints that fits the distribution of 
returns.
16 The advantage of the kernel estimation is that we do not need to constrain the 
distribution to be normal, or even symmetric.  
                                                 





















[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We estimate the kernel density for the market returns, both for the total sample and for 
the sub-sample of countries with regulatory changes. Figure 2 plots the histograms of returns, as 
well as the densities, depending on the existence of short–selling restrictions. Confirming the 
results in Table 4, Figure 2 shows that (i) the distribution of returns is more leptokurtotic when 
short sales are allowed and practiced.; and (ii) the distribution of returns is not symmetric.  
Conclusions 
Restrictions on short selling of shares are nearly as old as stock markets themselves.  
Critics often view short–sales as immoral—the exploitation of others’ misfortune and an 
exacerbating factor in periods of market crisis.  As recently as the Asian currency crisis of 1997, 
short–sellers were blamed by politicians and journalists for helping to destroy the “Asian 
Miracle.” In the current environment with the growth of hedge funds, concerns about the danger 
of allowing speculation frequently surface.  There is at least some common suspicion that short 
selling can exacerbate market crashes.  Most academic researchers, however, make a strong 
theoretical case for allowing short–sales in markets.  Their case is based upon the notion that 
markets exist to facilitate the efficient pricing of assets, and that restricting short–sales reduces 
                                                                                                                                                            
where N(·) is the kernel function, that we specify to be standard normal, λ  is the bandwidth parameter, n is the 
sample size, and xi is the ith observation. The kernel density minimizes the mean integrated squared error ηλ : 
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market efficiency. Recent empirical evidence by researchers, particularly Jones and Lamont 
(2001) provides some support for the hypothesis that difficulty in short selling is associated with 
security mispricing.  In this paper, we survey short–selling regulations and practices for major 
stock markets around the world.  We find empirical evidence in support of both views. Using a 
market efficiency measure developed by Mørck et al (2000), we find a negative association 
between short–sales restrictions and the diffusion of value-relevant information into prices. Our 
analysis of the statistical characteristics of markets, specifically the standard deviation and 
skewness of log returns, suggests that short–sales restrictions are more common in high-
volatility countries, but that the restrictions are also weakly associated with less negative 
skewness in individual stock returns.    
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When was short 
selling allowed





Argentina 1999 1991 No Equity lending is rare and occurs only between brokers. Short-selling cannot last more than 360 days in a row. Only allowed for 16 stocks.
Australia Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Securities can be borrowed from ASX and counter party. Cash and non-cash collateral are accepted at 105-110% of the underlying value of the loan 
securities. Collateral is marked-to-market daily.
Austria Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Belgium Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
There is no organized market for stock lending and borrowing. A law on securities lending was passed in March 1999 but still pending. There is no official 
regulation on short selling stocks.
Brazil Before 1990 Before 1990 No
CBLC has been authorized to maintain a securities lending program. Under CVM Instruction No. 249, only entities which offer settlement, registration, and custody services in the Brazilian 
market are authorized to provide securities lending services. Accordingly, foreign investors are not authorized to engage in directed/discretionary lending activities that are outside the CBLC 
program. 
Canada Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes The market for securities lending is large (40+ billion dollar business )and well developed.
Chile Allowed in 1999 Allowed in 1999 No
Short-selling cannot last more than 360 days in a row. The entity (including individuals) who is lending the stocks maintains the beneficial ownership, except 
the right to vote. 
Colombia Not allowed Not   allowed No Securities lending is not authorized.
Czech Republic Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
There is no regulations on short selling since Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) was opened in 1993. IT is possible to sell securities only if absent securities are 
bought or borrowed before the settlement date.
Denmark Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes No regulatory barriers inhibiting securities lending.
Finland Allowed in 1998 Before 1990 No The transfer tax laws place a serious burden on the activity.
France Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Securities lending is permitted by law in 1987 and 1988. All establishments (domestic and foreign) are eligible for short-selling as long as they are 
recognized as counter parties. 
Germany Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes A securities lending facility was created in 1989 to improve market liquidity.
Greece Not allowed Not   allowed No Securities lending and borrowing have been legalized by the Greek Parliament but the operational framework has yet to be established.
Hong Kong Allowed in 1996 Before 1990 Yes Short selling is allowed for 33 stocks in 1994, and then to a wide range of stocks in 1996.
India Before 1990 Before 1990 No Not popular among market players. Not allowed for foreign investors.
Indonesia Not allowed Allowed in 1996 No No guidelines have been provided by BAPEPAM, The Indonesian Regulatory Authority for the Indonesian Capital Market.
Ireland Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes Securities lending volume is still limited.
Israel Before 1990 Before 1990 No
The TASE does not offer a securities lending program to its members. TASE rules indicate that the securities account of a TASE member at clearing house 
may not enter into a short position intentionally. 
Italy Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Japan Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes Allowed for stocks listed on the first section of the exchanges.
Jordan Not allowed Not   allowed No
Luxembourg Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Malaysia
Allowed in 1995, Prohibited 
again in 1997
Allowed in 1995, Prohibited 
again in 1997 Yes
Short seling and securities lending were suspended during the regional financial crisis of 1997. With the economic recovery, improvements in report
requirements, prudential controls and the cessation of trading of KLSE-listed securities offshore, short selling and securities lending are expected to be 
restored restored.
Mexico Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
The system is generally used as a safeguard against failing to deliver rather than securities lending as a product. Foreign investors are eligible to participate 
in securities lending through a local broker. Margin is 150%.
Netherlands Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes There is a central lending facility at the ASE.
New Zealand Allowed in 1992 Not   allowed No Tax regulations prevents onshore securities lending from taking off.Country
When was short 
selling allowed





Norway Allowed in 1992 Allowed in 1996 Yes Securities lending is still in the early stages of development and tax implications are being discussed at the Ministry of Finance.
Pakistan Not allowed Not   allowed No There are no regulations that restrict foreign investors from lending or borrowing securities. Short selling is not allowed. 
Peru Not allowed Not   allowed No
Off shore lending is prohibited. Lima Stock Exchange is considering allowing new activities such as securities lending, short selling and new repo trades in 
the future.
Philippines Allowed in 1998 Allowed in 1998 No Although the SEC has approved the rules on SBL and short selling, the rules are not yet clearly defined in the market.
Poland Allowed in 2000 Before 1990 No Neither the full legal nor operational framework have been established.
Portugal Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes Securities lending is allowed and practiced. BVLP charges 10 b.p. annualized over the initial value (maximum days for calculation is 45 ) for this service. 
Singapore Not allowed Before 1990 Yes Onshore lending is limited while offshore lending is active.
Slovak Republic Not allowed Not   allowed No Securities lending and borrowing is not allowed under the Securities Act.
South Africa Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes Short selling is always allowed in JSE.
South Korea Not allowed Before 1990 No Securities lending and borrowing has not been active to date.
Spain Allowed in 1992 Allowed in 1992 No
Securities lending and short selling is available since 1992. Since July 1994, SCLV has acted as principal for the lending pool formed by the daily bids from 
the clearing members. The load must be reported to the SCLV within two working days of the sale date. 
Sweden Allowed in 1991 Allowed in 1991 Yes Widely practiced.
Switzerland Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Securities lending is legal in Switzerland and there are no restrictions on who may borrow or lend. There is no central lending facility and no stamp duties 
apply to securities lending.
Taiwan Not allowed Not   allowed No Foreign investors are prohibited from borrowing securities on-shore and can only lend securities on-shore to brokers to cover their fails. 
Thailand Allowed in 1997 Allowed in 1999 Yes Short selling is very limited after being allowed in 1999.
Turkey Before 1990 Allowed in 1996 No Securities lending is not widely practiced. 
United Kingdom Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes Short selling is active in UK.
United States Before 1990 Before 1990 Yes
Venezuela Not allowed Not   allowed No
Securities lending is not specifically prohibited or provided for under current regulations. Free transfers of securities between different beneficial owners 
cannot be done without executing a trade on the exchange. Off-shore lending is generally not practiced.
Zimbabwe Not allowed Not   allowed No
Table 1. Short Selling Restrictions Around the World 
For each country in the sample, the table describes the date where short selling was allowed if this happened on or after 1990.
Otherwise countries are classified as ‘Allowed Before 1990’, or ‘Not Allowed’. Securities Lending refers to the ability of an
investor to borrow securities from another party. Short Selling refers to the ability of an investor to sell a borrowed security to a
third party. Short Selling is practiced when there are indications from market participants, market regulators, or institutions
within a country, that short selling is a common practice. Data is obtained from the Global Network Management Division at
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, the International Securities Lending at Goldman Sachs, the corresponding market regulators, the
International Securities Services Association Handbook, and practitioners listed in the Worldwide Directory of Securities 
Lending and Repo. Dependent Variable : Average Fraction of Stocks Moving Together
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -1.379 *** -13.05 -0.260 *** -9.88 -0.134 *** -4.55 -0.017 -0.51 -0.025 -0.80
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 1.404 *** 5.99 -0.146 *** -4.21 -0.180 *** -4.87 -0.066 -1.26 -0.345 ** -2.61
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 0.991 *** 4.02 1.130 *** 4.54
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.340 * -1.88 -0.493 ** -2.54
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 0.020 1.05 0.012 0.60
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 97.137 *** 3.38 86.044 *** 2.99
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.063 *** 3.33 0.076 *** 3.84
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -1.90E-07 *** -4.44 4.63E-02 ** 2.41
Dependent Variable 0.79 0.12
Number of Observations 503 503 423 255 255
Adjusted R-squared   84.14% 61.02% 62.36% 68.29% 68.87%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Short Selling is Allowed and Practiced 0.49 0.50 -0.194 ** -2.49 -0.198 *** -3.29 -0.214 *** -3.85 -0.266 *** -2.72 -0.264 *** -2.70
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -1.755 *** -19.90 -0.270 *** -8.81 -0.112 *** -3.62 0.030 0.89 0.021 0.66
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 0.592 * 1.96 -0.069 * -1.76 -0.135 *** -3.32 -0.023 -0.37 -0.298 ** -2.18
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 1.032 *** 4.00 1.170 *** 4.47
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.319 * -1.97 -0.472 *** -2.67
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 0.029 1.53 0.021 1.06
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 48.716 1.43 39.172 1.17
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.072 *** 3.40 0.085 *** 3.91
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -2.00E-07 *** -4.70 4.57E-02 ** 2.33
Dependent Variable 0.79 0.12
Number of Observations 503 503 448 268 268
Adjusted R-squared 91.11% 62.68% 63.34% 69.60% 70.15%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 2. Comovement of Stocks: Proportion of Stocks moving together
The dependent variable is the proportion of stocks moving together in each country and year. For each day, we compute the maximum of the number of stocks with positive returns,
and the number of stocks with negative returns, relative to the total number of stocks. We then calculate the average of this ratio for each country and year. The number of firms is
the number of firms with available stock price data in Datastream, in each country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of 
every firm in each country and year, relative to the corresponding country's total sales. Industry Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every
industry in each country and year, relative to the corresponding country's total sales. The size of the country is the extension of a country in square kilometers, from
www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated as in Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and 
Repudiation of Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The Short Selling variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given
country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 52 countries with stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the
Economist Intelligence Unit database. All regressions include year-fixed effects. Standard errors are White-heteroskedasticity consistent. Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -1.163 *** -12.95 -0.129 *** -6.63 -0.129 *** -4.05 -0.021 -0.57 -0.022 -0.60
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 -0.360 ** -2.13 -0.171 *** -4.56 -0.094 * -1.86 -0.273 *** -3.70 -0.312 -1.38
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 -0.351 -0.83 -0.332 -0.78
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.081 -0.48 -0.103 -0.54
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 -0.091 *** -4.14 -0.092 *** -3.98
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 93.240 ** 3.52 91.682 *** 3.11
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 -0.004 -0.18 -0.002 -0.10
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 1.09E-07 * 1.78 6.51E-03 0.22
Dependent Variable 0.22 0.20
Number of Observations 503 503 423 255 255
Adjusted R-squared 99.60% 22.63% 16.13% 29.52% 29.30%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Short Selling is Allowed and Practiced 0.49 0.50 -0.144  -1.17 -0.395 *** -4.79 -0.367 *** -4.20 -0.431 *** -4.52 -0.431 *** -4.52
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -0.992 *** -11.40 -0.074 *** -3.39 -0.100 *** -2.96 0.047 1.10 0.047 1.10
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 0.597 * 1.93 -0.054 -1.20 0.007 0.12 -0.160 ** -2.29 -0.153 -0.74
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 -0.250 -0.67 -0.254 -0.67
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.016 -0.10 -0.012 -0.07
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 -0.072 *** -3.26 -0.072 *** -3.13
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 23.107 0.78 23.341 0.74
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.012 0.47 0.012 0.44
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 1.05E-07 * 1.72 -1.12E-03 -0.04
Dependent Variable 0.22 0.20
Number of Observations 503 503 448 268 268
Adjusted R-squared 99.64% 23.37% 20.05% 33.66% 33.43%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 3. Comovement of Stocks: R-squared
The dependent variable is the average R-squared of by-firm and year regressions of weekly stock returns on the market index. The number of firms is the number of firms with available stock price data in Datastream,
in each country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of everyfirm in each country and year, relative to the corresponding country'stotal sales. IndustryHerfindahl
index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every industry in each country and year, relative to the corresponding country'stotal sales. The size of the country is the extension of a country in square
kilometers, from www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated as in Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and Repudiation of
Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The Short Selling variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes
firms from 52 countries with stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. All regressions include year-fixed effects. Standard errors a
Dependent Variable : R-squared of regressions of Stock Returns on Market IndicesDependent Variable: Mean Skewness of Individual Stock Raw Returns
Mean St. Dev Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Short Selling Allowed & Practiced 0.49 0.50 -0.010 -0.10 0.323 0.60 -1.983 ** -2.24 -2.024 ** -2.27 -2.021 ** -2.32
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -0.049 -0.30 0.214 1.15 0.332 1.43 -0.240 -0.53 -0.076 -0.17 -0.053 -0.10
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 0.092 0.15 -0.742 * -1.90 -0.958 *** -2.36 -1.131 -1.41 4.021 *** 3.05 3.887 *** 3.02
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 1.957 0.59 -0.637 -0.19 -0.746 -0.22
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -2.096 -0.92 0.786 0.31 0.819 0.33
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 0.370 * 1.77 0.518 ** 2.48 0.519 ** 2.57
Variance in GDP growth 0.00 0.00 -843.526 ** -2.23 -664.567 ** -2.01 -685.497 ** -2.01
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.402 ** 2.04 0.169 0.86 0.180 0.95
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -8.57E-01 *** -3.38 -8.45E-01 *** -3.41
Lagged Turnover 0.073 0.406 -0.001 -0.07
Lagged Market Return 0.022 0.384 -0.066 ** -2.30
Dependent Variable -0.095 0.484
Number of Observations 503 503 503 300 300 300
Adjusted R-squared 14.78% 2.03% 2.53% 6.02% 9.29%   3.42%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO NO
Dependent Variable: Skewness of Market Returns
Mean St. Dev Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Short Selling Allowed & Practiced 0.49 0.50 -1.021 -1.37 -0.087 -0.63 -0.219 -1.06 -0.222  -1.07 -0.246 -1.19
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 1.870 ** 2.17 -0.057 * -1.74 -0.061 -1.58 0.005 0.05 0.015   0.16 0.076 0.72
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 -3.006 -0.86 -0.226 *** -3.05 -0.204 ** -2.25 -0.235 -1.47 0.083   0.22 0.009 0.02
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 0.421 0.78 0.261  0.49 0.332 0.64
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.995 *** -3.01 -0.817 ** -2.22 -0.878 ** -2.38
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 -0.073 -1.04 -0.064  -0.90 -0.076 -1.08
Variance in GDP growth 0.00 0.00 -186.803 *** -3.50 -175.745 *** -3.24 -199.895 *** -3.38
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 -0.124 -1.59 -0.138 * -1.74 -0.149 * -1.90
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -5.30E-02  -1.14 -4.38E-02 -0.93
Lagged Turnover 0.073 0.406 -0.004 ** -2.46
Lagged Market Return 0.022 0.384 -0.002 -0.22
Dependent Variable 1.745 5.809
Number of Observations 503 503 503 300 300 300.000
Adjusted R-squared 70.75% 5.97% 5.62% 2.59% 2.68% 3.99%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO NO
Dependent Variable: Mean Skewness of Individual Stock Abnormal Returns
Mean St. Dev Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Short Selling Allowed & Practiced 0.49 0.50 0.007 0.08 0.277 0.55 -1.743 ** -2.47 -1.777 ** -2.54 -1.955 *** -2.87
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 -0.165 -1.42 0.106 0.71 0.139 0.73 -0.262 -0.63 -0.124 -0.30 0.157 0.39
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 -0.289 -0.88 -0.227 -0.75 -0.236 -0.69 -0.212 -0.41 4.128 *** 3.44 3.867 *** 3.31
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 3.169 1.26 0.984 0.39 1.138 0.46
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -2.086 -1.10 0.342 0.17 0.233 0.11
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 0.180 1.18 0.304 * 1.89 0.263 * 1.71
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 -717.867 *** -2.82 -567.098 ** -2.39 -666.787 *** -2.87
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.362 ** 2.21 0.166 1.07 0.126 0.85
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -7.22E-01 *** -3.95 -6.87E-01 *** -3.89
Lagged Turnover 0.073 0.406 -0.017 * -1.69
Lagged Market Return 0.022 0.384 0.010 0.54
Dependent Variable -0.162 0.395
Number of Observations 503 503 503 300 300 300.000
Adjusted R-squared 40.43% 1.78% 1.83% 6.47% 10.81% 11.85%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 4. Short Selling Restrictions and Skewness of Stock Returns
The dependent variable is the skewness of log(1+r), where r denotes stock returns in each country and year. The skewness of raw returns is calculated as the skewness of the total sample of weekly stock
returns in each country and year. The skewness of abnormal returns is the skewness of log(1+u), where u is the residual of a regression of weekly stock returns on the market index, for each firm in every
country and year. The skewness of the market return is the skewness of the value-weighted market index return, in each country and year. The number of firms is the number of firms with available stock 
price data in Datastream, in each country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every firm in each country and year, relative to the corresponding 
country's total sales. Industry Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every industry in each country and year, relative to the corresponding country's total sales. The
size of the country is the extension of a country in square kilometers, from www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated as in Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the
sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and Repudiation of Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The Short Selling variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed
and practiced in a given country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 52 countries with stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit database. All regressions include year-fixed effects. Standard errors are White-heteroskedasticity consistent. Dependent Variable : Average Standard Deviation of Individual Stock Returns
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Short Selling is Allowed and Practiced 0.49 0.50 0.058 1.33 -0.101 *** -3.19 -0.103 *** -3.14 -0.100 *** -3.05 -0.260 *** -7.02
Log (Number of Firms) 4.63 1.93 0.047 0.95 0.051 *** 4.96 0.046 *** 3.25 0.068 *** 4.60 0.097 *** 5.96
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 -0.081 -0.52 -0.147 *** -9.89 -0.112 *** -5.97 0.020 0.44 0.028 0.54
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 0.156 1.59 0.324 ** 2.42 -0.041 -0.48
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.075 -1.07 -0.170 ** -2.36 -0.018 -0.30
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 0.001 0.11 -0.002 -0.34 0.032 *** 4.82
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 80.493 *** 6.03 81.662 *** 6.16 10.073 0.71
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.064 *** 4.85
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -0.021 *** -3.03 -0.021 *** -2.81
Dependent Variable 0.046 0.016
Number of Observations 503 503 454 416 264
Adjusted R-squared 97.28% 99.27% 99.35% 99.35% 99.69%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 5. Distribution of Stock Returns and Short-Selling Restrictions
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of individual stock returns, averaged across countries and years. The number of firms is the number of firms with available stock
price data in Datastream, in each country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every firm in each country and year, relative
to the corresponding country's total sales. Industry Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every industry in each country and year, relative to the 
corresponding country's total sales. The size of the country is the extension of a country in square kilometers, from www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated
as in Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and Repudiation of Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The 
Short Selling variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 
52 countries with stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. All regressions include year-
fixed effects. Standard errors are White-heteroskedasticity consistent. Dependent Variable : Frequency of Extreme Results (Less than 2 x St. Dev)
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Short Selling is Allowed and Practiced 0.49 0.50 0.135 0.65 -0.009 -0.17 -0.030 -0.49 -0.010 -0.16 -0.169 ** -2.18
Log (GDP per capita) 9.21 0.88 0.355 0.81 -0.038 -0.95 -0.048 -0.90 0.016 0.15 0.043 0.38
Country Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.21 0.212 1.08 0.059 0.18 0.332 0.93
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.27 -0.159 -1.37 -0.133 -0.72 -0.120 -0.67
Log (Country Size) 12.05 3.63 -0.004 -0.29 -0.001 -0.09 0.018 1.31
Variance in GDP growth 0.0014 0.0011 -31.398 -1.12 -14.869 -0.51 -25.764 -0.74
Earnings Comovement Index 1.69 6.29 0.039 1.52
Good Government Index 23.26 5.04 -0.006 -0.41 -0.006 -0.33
Dependent Variable 0.07 0.09
Number of Observations 503 503 465 426 269
Adjusted R-squared 97.84% 96.92% 97.29% 97.42% 98.42%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 6. Frequency of Extreme Returns and Short-Selling Restrictions
The dependent variables is the per year number of trading days where the market return is lower than the average market return minus two standard deviations, divided by the total
number of trading days. The endogenous variable is mapped on the set of real numbers, with the transformation log(x/(1-x)). The mean and standard deviation of the market return is 
calculated over the same country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every firm in each country and year, relative to the 
corresponding country's total sales. Industry Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every industry in each country and year, relative to the
corresponding country's total sales. The size of the country is the extension of a country in square kilometers, from www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated as in 
Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and Repudiation of Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The Short Selling 
variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 52 countries with
stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. All regressions include year-fixed effects. Standard 
errors are White-heteroskedasticity consistent. Years Relative 
to Change in 
Law
Hong 
Kong Malaysia Norway Sweden Thailand Average
-7 4.85% 4.85%
-6 1.63% 7.58% 4.60%
-5 4.60% 3.88% 4.78% 4.42%
-4 4.64% 4.61% 5.46% 4.90%
-3 4.52% 4.68% 6.58% 5.26%
-2 3.50% 4.07% 1.87% 5.54% 3.74%
-1 3.38% 5.06% 2.08% 1.57% 4.91% 3.40%
0 4.17% 3.37% 3.59% 1.79% 3.02% 3.19%
1 4.44% 5.93% 3.78% 1.86% 2.45% 3.69%
2 3.18% 4.86% 3.42% 2.96% 1.69% 3.22%
3 3.99% 2.29% 5.07% 4.00% 2.23% 3.82%
4 6.75% 3.04% 5.27% 2.78% 2.87% 4.42%
5 7.36% 4.50% 10.71% 3.78% 7.28%
6 3.80% 5.65% 8.56% 7.10%
7 1.98% 5.02% 3.50%
8 5.05% 5.39% 5.22%
9 2.84% 5.75% 4.29%
10 2.93% 2.93%
Law Changed in: 1996 1995 1992 1991 1997
Table 7. Frequency of Extreme Returns and Short-Selling Restrictions. Countries with Regulatory
changes only
Number of trading days where the market return is lower than the average market return minus
two standard deviations, divided by the total number of trading days, around the elimination of
short selling restrictions. Only the five countries with regulatory changes between 1990 and 
2001–Hong Kong, Norway, Sweden, Malaysia, and Thailand–are considered. The sample 
includes firms from these countries with stock price information available from Datastream. For 
each firm and year, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of returns, and calculate the 
number of days where the return is below the average return, minus two standard deviation. We
aggregate this number by country and year, and divide by the total number of firm-days in the 
year with available stock price information. Dependent Variable : Frequency of Negative Extreme Returns (Less than 2 x St. Dev)
Mean St. Dev Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Short Selling is Allowed and Practiced 0.33 0.48 0.395 * 1.91 0.295 1.62 0.315 * 1.66 0.326 * 1.77 0.214 1.16
Log (GDP per capita) 9.44 0.73 -1.241 -1.11 -0.173 ** -2.06 -0.341 ** -2.10 2.666 ** 2.61 1.821 1.59
Country Herfindahl Index 0.09 0.09 2.271 1.17 6.013 *** 3.11 0.059 0.02
Industry Herfindahl Index 0.24 0.28 0.025 0.04 -0.874 -1.46 7.520 ** 2.53
Log (Country Size) 11.71 2.39 -0.070 ** -2.08 0.295 ** 2.28 18.496 *** 2.96
Variance in GDP growth 0.0021 0.0015 -19.711 -0.40 -917.378 *** -3.03 -5154.825 *** -3.69
Earnings Comovement Index 1.36 2.46 17.810 *** 2.90
Good Government Index 25.43 3.63 -0.843 *** -2.97 -2.450 *** -4.54
Dependent Variable 0.06 0.03
Number of Observations 45 45 37 37 37
Adjusted R-squared 99.23% 98.28% 98.39% 98.54% 98.71%
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effects YES NO NO NO NO
*, **, *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels or better, respectively
Table 8. Frequency of Extreme Returns and Short-Selling Restrictions. Countries with Regulatory changes only
The dependent variables is the per year number of trading days where the market return is lower than the average market return minus two standard deviations, divided by the total
number of trading days. The endogenous variable is mapped on the set of real numbers, with the transformation log(x/(1-x)). The mean and standard deviation of the market return is 
calculated over the same country and year. Country Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every firm in each country and year, relative to the 
corresponding country's total sales. Industry Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the market shares (squared) of every industry in each country and year, relative to the
corresponding country's total sales. The size of the country is the extension of a country in square kilometers, from www.yahoo.com. The earnings comovement index is calculated as in 
Morck et al. (2000). The Good Government index is the sum of the Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, and Repudiation of Contract indices from La Porta et al. (1997). The Short 
Selling variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given country and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from Hong 
Kong, Norway, Sweden, Malaysia, and Thailand, with stock price information available from Datastream. Macroeconomic variables are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database.




























































Figure 1. Comovement of Stock Returns and Short Sales Restrictions 
Proportion of Stocks Comoving together agains skewness of market returns. For each day, we compute the maximum 
of the number of stocks with positive returns, and the number of stocks with negative returns, relative to the total 
number of stocks. We then calculate the average of this ratio for each country and year. Countries are classified 
depending on whether short sales are allowed and practiced (boxes), or not (crosses). The sample includes firms from 










Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimation 
Histogram and kernel density estimation of weekly market log-returns, depending on the existence of 
short–selling restrictions. The Kernel Density is estimated as detailed in footnote 15. The Short Selling 
variable is a dummy variable that equals one when short selling is allowed and practiced in a given country 
and year, zero otherwise. The sample includes firms from 52 countries with stock price information 
available from Datastream. Returns are pooled across years. The first two graphs corresponds to all the 
countries in the sample. The last to figures consider only the countries that have changed their regulation 
during the sample period–Hong Kong, Malaysia, Norway, Sweden, and Thailand. 






Short Selling Allowed and Practiced. Countries with Changes in Regulation 
 
 
Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimation (cont) 
 
 
 
 